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Liberation theologies are the principal forms of Christian prophetic thought and action in 
our contemporary age. They represent the ways of life and struggle of Christians around the world 
who have convinced remnants of the church to open its eyes to human misery and oppose 
socioeconomic systems and political structures that perpetuate such misery. Like all serious modes of 
inquiry, liberation theologies are predicated on crisis— on human situations of tremendous danger 
and incipient possibility. Such concrete crises invariably generate forms of critical consciousness. 
Liberation theologies are the predominant forms of critical consciousness within the Christian 
church that respond to the dangers of class, racial, and sexual privilege, and project the possibility of 
class, racial, and sexual equality.  
Black, Feminist, Native American, Hispanic, and especially Latin American versions of 
liberation theology have made major contributions to Christian thought and the life of the church. 
The theological theme of God's identification with the poor and oppressed now resounds 
throughout our seminaries, takes shape in some of our ecclesiastical agencies, and regulates the 
practices in a select few of our churches. The methodological mandate for systemic social analysis of 
structures of domination in light of the good news of Jesus Christ is forcing many theologians, 
preachers, and laity to take seriously the works of Karl Marx and Max Weber, Simone de Beauvoir 
and W.E.B. Du Bois, Anthony Giddens, and Christopher Lasch. In short, liberation theologies have 
pushed religious thinkers beyond their usual parochial concerns and challenged churches to become 
more enlightened participants in the great political and economic issues of our time.  
But beneath this intense intellectual ferment and heated political discourse lurks a hidden 
truth: the high moment of liberation theology has passed. The original texts of James Cone, Mary Daly, 
and Gustavo Gutirrez spawned widely diffused and dispersed theological currents. As with all 
ground-breaking upsurges, liberation theologies emerged with impressive power and insight and 
presently have evolved in diverse and multiple forms.  
This evolution of liberation theologies is particularly noteworthy in that these theologies 
ushered forth from an academic discipline which suffers from an immense identity crisis. Hence, the 
early enthusiasm for liberation theologies can be attributed not only to the relevance of their 
perspectives for the oppressed but also to the hope that these theologies would breathe new life into a 
fading and faltering mode of intellectual reflection. To put it crudely, liberation theologies were 
expected to both change the world and keep theology alive.  
Yet as the zenith of liberation theological reflection fades, we witness the proliferation of 
philosophical investigations, cultural critiques, social analyses, and historical reconstructions from 
Christian liberationist perspectives. The theological concerns of liberation theology are now shifting 
to either philosophical, cultural, social analytical, or historical concerns. This move requires not only 
rigorous interdisciplinary tools, but also more intense interaction with secular colleagues -- thereby 
facilitating more religious participation within the larger public conversation in society and culture at 
large.  
This positive dialogue and candid alliance with both the Academy and political movements 
helps break down the walls of demarcation between divinity schools and universities, preachers and 
political activists. But it also could result in a new kind of theological evasion, a refusal to take 
seriously the difficult task of specifying Christian identity in a pluralistic world. And as the tentacles 
of secular professionalism and vulgar politicization further pervade our seminaries and divinity 
schools, even the theological task itself could become passé.  
In regard to this precarious though pregnant situation, liberation theologies more than likely 
will move in one of four directions. They will: (1) relapse back into traditional kinds of systematic 
theology equipped with new themes, motifs, and insights—as in Jon Sobrino's Christology at the 
Crossroads; (2) retreat into versions of philosophical anthropology (that is, a philosophy of human 
existence) which appeal to Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach, or the early Marx and thereby subvert systematic 
theology—as in Juan Luis Segundo's The Liberation of Theology; (3) spill over into social theory, 
cultural criticism, and historical reconstruction which may take either Christian or post-Christian 
forms—as in Elisabeth Schüssler-Fiorenza's In Memory of Her or Mary Daly's Gynecology, 
respectively; or (4) resort to practical writings in journalistic styles which attempt to reach the 
general literate laity and clergy—as in James Cone's My Soul Looks Back.  
The first alternative is essential but limited; it preserves precious links with elements of the 
tradition and church but at the inescapable expense of intellectual marginality in our secular 
intellectual milieu. The second option, philosophic anthropology, is a trap to be avoided by both 
theologians and philosophers alike; it succumbs to a seductive quest for universal categorical schemas 
that yield either formal results too empty for usefulness or transcendental frameworks that conceal 
their historicity. The third line of development is the most fruitful and challenging; it sidelines many 
narrowly trained theologians and gives prominence to Christian and secular social theorists, cultural 
critics, and historians. The last direction performs a crucial propagandistic role, but provides little, if 
any, intellectual depth.  
Juan Luis Segundo's Faith and Ideologies exemplifies the second option. This book builds on 
his earlier work and puts forward a full-blown philosophical anthropology—a detailed specification 
of "the universal dimensions of human beings." Segundo is the most ambitious and audacious of the 
Latin American liberation religious thinkers. He disregards the traditional intellectual division of 
labor in the university and eagerly pursues a daring idea; no matter how half-baked that idea may be. 
In this book, Segundo's ambition and audacity lead to organizational fragmentation and 
philosophical confusion.  
Segundo's aim in this text is threefold. First, to infuse new content in the categorical notions 
of faith and ideology. Second, to explore how these two ideas relate to one another, using 
Christianity and Marxism as interlocutors. Third, to examine the concrete situation of present-day 
Latin America in light of his philosophical perspective. Like Immanuel Kant and Matthew Arnold, 
Segundo wants to preserve the transcendent character of moral conduct yet create a comprehensive 
secular discourse which subsumes religion. In short, his primary intention is to displace theology and 
put forward a new philosophical anthropology.  
But in Chapter I entitled "Toward A New Statement of the Problem," it becomes quite clear 
that Segundo's philosophical anthropology is not new at all. Rather it is a warmed-over version of 
neo-Kantianism—much less refined than those found in Wilhelm Dilthey or Jürgen Habermas. 
Segundo's two "basic anthropological dimensions" are faith and ideology. He understands "' faith" 
to be the human acquisition of meaning and value principally by means of socialization. "Ideology" 
is taken to be the human techniques of efficacy and predictability necessary to actualize one's value-
laden ends or goals.  
Following Gregory Bateson's Steps to an Ecology of Mind, Segundo defines faith as a "partially 
self-validating" set of "epistemological and ontological premises" which human beings impose on 
"the flux of happenings" for purposes of order and coherence. Since these "premises" circumscribe 
the limits of human knowledge, they are immune from rational validation, hence "self-validating." 
Yet Segundo also defines faith as a "certain type of knowledge." Here confusion sets in. Can faith be 
a set of "premises" which delimit what we can and do know and also be a certain type of knowledge? 
Is the latter a transcendental form of knowledge, a special kind of knowledge that enables us to know 
the premises that constitute preconditions for knowledge? Is this not viciously circular? Or does 
Segundo mean that the premises are socially derived and hence we know them through social and 
historical analysis? If so, then can he consistently claim that faith is "an anthropological dimension as 
universal as the human species itself"? Surely not. He must either fall back on neo- Kantianism and 
provide an account of faith as an anthropological dimension or adopt a Mannheimian sociology of 
knowledge and give up talk about such dimensions. At one point in his text, Segundo endorses 
Mannheim's "real sociology of knowledge" yet still characterizes the indispensable unconditional 
absolute as a value, a "transcendent datum." Like Kant of the Critique of Practical Reason, 
philosophical anthropology has solely a self-validating, i.e., moral basis. But, following Mannhelm, if 
morality is socially constituted, philosophical anthropology is undercut.  
To add more confusion, Segundo understands faith as "the fund of saved energy on which all 
human planning is based." In addition to this technocratic image of faith, Segundo's attempt to link 
this conception of faith to his overarching theory of evolution -- with its desirable homeostatic 
mechanisms and the "best energy calculus"—is utterly unconvincing. Owing to his imprecise and 
amorphous definitions of faith, it is difficult to follow his comparative criticisms of Pannenberg's 
notion of trust and Tracy's conception of religion.  
In his discussion of faith, Segundo relies upon a pre-Wittgensteinian view of language. That 
is, in contrast to Wittgenstein's view that language constitutes our social world, Segundo holds that 
language expresses private worlds. In order to make clear how people "express in words their values-
structure, their meaning-world," Segundo engages in some close readings of poems -- especially 
Gustavo Adolfo Bécquer's famous Rima. After a rather idiosyncratic though interesting 
interpretation, Segundo highlights human "access, through the medium of language, to the vast, 
structured realm of meaning and values." This neo-Kantian vocabulary, found in Emst Cassirer and 
Susanne K. Langer, is highly suspect. Yet, ironically, Segundo persists with this expressivist view of 
language even after invoking the work of the later Wittgenstein which precludes any such view. At 
this point one is forced to conclude that Segundo's intellectual project yields philosophical 
confusion.  
Similar to Habermas, Segundo fears that meaning-structures (faith) are "structured in terms 
of efficacy (ideology) alone." That is, issues involving value are reduced to technical matters. And 
this fear is justified. But is not his own technocratic conception of faith a reduction of meaning to 
mere use, planning, and efficacy? If so, he promotes the very program he fears. Segundo rightly 
exposes the dimension of faith in modern and postmodern science—a point noted by David Hume 
and refined by Michael Polanyi—yet his means-ends mode of philosophical and political analysis 
reeks of technocratic rationality. Even John Dewey, no friend of modern Luddites like Martin 
Heidegger, grappled more seriously with the reductionist implications and managerial consequences 
of crude means-ends analyses.  
The second and third parts of Segundo's book are much better than the first. The section on 
Christianity and Marxism is, though far from original, competent. His claims regarding Marx's 
rejection of philosophy for science and opposition to ontological materialism are persuasive. Yet his 
defense of Erich Fromm's claim that Marx put forward a philosophical anthropology—which is true 
for the early Marx but rejected by the later Marx—is perplexing. Segundo rightly suggests that the 
continuity between the early and later Marx consists of his "ideal conception of the human being." 
But does such an ideal constitute a philosophical anthropology? Does the mere possession of values 
mean that one adheres to a philosophical anthropology? Surely not. So why defend Fromm's 
exorbitant claim?  
The last section of Segundo's book is a sketch of "a Latin American anthropology"—a 
reading of Latin American realities from 1950-1975 in light of his philosophical perspective. After 
brief generalizations of the periods of consciousness-raising, violent action, and repression, Segundo 
tries to go beyond mere economic and political analysis and accents "the ecological state of human 
beings" in relation to nature, the state, and class exploitation. He ends his book calling for the 
creation of "an effective cultural tradition"—a task to be achieved only if the supreme evolutionary 
quality, flexibility, is internalized and transmitted to the younger generation of freedom fighters. 
In stark contrast to The Liberation of Theology, Segundo's Faith and Ideologies is more a 
phenomenon than an event, a symptom of the second alternative in the evolution of liberation 
theologies rather than a mover and shaker on the contemporary scene. His book illustrates the severe 
limitations of opting for a full-blown philosophical anthropology. And even if one decides to do so, 
it is better to revise already refined versions rather than create one's own out of thin air or derived 
from anthropologists and psychologists.  
In my opinion, the major intellectual task of liberation theologians is to continue to 
reexamine and reshape the traditional doctrines of the church, engage in more serious efforts of 
social theory, cultural criticism, and historical reconstruction, and write palpable and intelligible 
essays and texts for the nonacademic literate laity and clergy. Needless to say, these three activities 
require different persons working on different terrains. The church theologians are not likely to put 
forward sophisticated social analyses, just as the more broadly engaged social theorist cannot possibly 
do justice to the complexities of church theology—though both can write for a wider audience.  
Furthermore, if liberation theologies have taught us anything, it is that Christian thinkers 
must be organically linked with prophetic churches and progressive movements. An uncommitted 
and detached liberation theologian is a contradiction in terms. Without some form of ecclesiastical 
and political praxis, critical consciousness becomes as sounding brass and theological reflection a 
tinkling cymbal. 
